This paper analyzes the effects of additional information in a life insurance market under adverse selection. Individuals have an incentive to acquire information about their risk type if their informational status cannot be observed by insurers. In aggregate, however, the existence of a testing opportunity has an effect on the equilibrium premium. We describe the conditions under which, from an ex ante standpoint, all individuals gain, all lose or in which some gain and some lose from the existence of the test.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether information such as that obtained from genetic screening has positive or negative value in a life insurance market which displays adverse selection. In many countries existing or proposed legislation prohibits the use of genetic tests for ratemaking purposes and so assessing the impact of such information in the context of a model in which information about risk type is both private and increasing is an important exercise. Also, other types of health tests generate what is effectively private information for insureds.
The question of the private and social value of additional information in insurance markets has been analyzed by Doherty and Thistle (1996) in the context of the usual insurance model of adverse selection. As we do, they analyze the case where insurers cannot observe whether consumers have obtained a test. They show that, in this context, acquiring information usually has a positive private value since by taking the test the market possibilities (especially the price of insurance) do not change for the individual but better information allows consumers to make a more informed choice; that is, to adjust the amount of insurance they buy to what is optimal for their risk type. However, the social value of the testing opportunity is negative. If there were no asymmetric information before the test, all individuals would insure for a medium premium. If insurers could observe test results then, depending on the outcome of the test, some (those with good news) could buy insurance cheaper and for those with bad news, the premium would increase. By the martingale property of conditional expectation, the expected premium would be the same as the medium premium before, but since the premium is a random variable and individuals are risk averse, all are worse off from an ex ante perspective. Asymmetric information after the test aggravates this problem, since low risks (those with good news) cannot buy full insurance for the low premium but must signal their type by purchasing only partial coverage.
Our model departs from Doherty and Thistle' s in that we analyze the same problem in a life insurance model. The fundamental difference between life insurance and other insurance policies is, from an institutional point of view, that individuals can buy life insurance from as many companies as they want and therefore price-quantity contracts are not a feasible means against adverse selection; insurance companies can only quote a uniform price for all life 1 insurance contracts. A second important difference between life insurance and other insurance is that there is no natural choice for the size of loss. In most models of insurance there is a fixed insurable loss l and this loss is independent of its probability of occurring. Thus, a risk averse individual when faced with an actuarially fair premium will purchase full coverage insurance regardless of her probability of loss. Increasing symmetric information about risk type will therefore not have any potential for increased consumption efficiency in terms of the amount of insurance desired. In the context of life insurance, however, this is not the case as a change in the probability of death can, and as we show generally does, lead to changes in the amount of insurance demanded even when these probabilities are symmetrically observed. Thus, information of the type we study here has an added possible dimension for providing positive social value by allowing for better informed consumption choices.
There are several reasons for concerning ourselves specifically with the impact of genetic information in a pure adverse selection model. First, the impending completion of the Human Genome Project, which is a massive international effort to map and sequence the entire human genome, will accelerate recent successes in the discovery of disease genes and the development of associated genetic screening tests. This will lead to screening tests becoming available at much lower costs which will thus be used more frequently. Second, many countries ban the use 2 of information from genetic screening tests for ratemaking purposes ; also, other practical considerations make it natural to assume increasing but private information. Third, most known genetic diseases are not amenable to effective 3 medical treatments which justifies the use of a pure adverse selection model. Consistent with Doherty and Thistle, we find that the private value of becoming informed is positive in our model. More surprisingly, the social (ex ante) value of information may be either negative (as in the normal insurance model) or positive and we describe the scenarios and construct examples for both possible sets of cases. The intuition why additional information might lead to a Pareto improvement is as follows. Suppose there are three groups, high risks, low risks and initially uninformed individuals who may be high or low risks. Suppose that in the reference situation only high risks buy life insurance (this is possible since the premium might be unacceptably high for low risks and uninformed individuals); hence the premium will be based on the high risks' probability of death. Now suppose a test for uninformed consumers becomes available. If consumers were not to adapt their insurance purchases to their new information, their ex ante expected utility would be unchanged. However, although uninformed consumers who test negative (i.e. learn that they are low risks) will still not buy life insurance, those testing positive (the high risks) will. Therefore, the ex ante expected utility for uninformed consumers is increased by the new testing opportunity.
Besides there being a possible positive value of insurance for those who take the test, there is also the possibility of positive price spillover effects for those who don't take the test. To see how this can occur, suppose there is a range of risk types so that an uninformed individual who takes a test may be determined to be one of a number of higher or lower risk types. Suppose such a person initially does not buy insurance and upon testing discovers she is of a high risk type but that she carries a risk level less than the average of those who initially purchase insurance. If she now purchases insurance the result will be a lower equilibrium price of insurance which will be to the advantage of the original pool of insurance buyers. Negative spillover effects from increased information, which are generally stressed for standard insurance models such as that of Doherty and Thistle (1996) , are also possible in our model. Such a situation arises in our model when the initially uninformed individuals discover themselves to be a risk type higher than the average risk of those originally purchasing insurance.
The model for the life insurance market we use is similar to that developed in Villeneuve (1996) to explain the effect of adverse selection on the markets for life insurance and annuities. Our model is developed in such a way as to stress the life insurance purchasing decision of individuals for the purpose of replacing lost income due to premature death.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple model of life insurance demand and some results concerning the comparative statics of this model. In Section 3 we analyze, for different test scenarios, the ex ante welfare implications of the testing opportunity, taking account of the fact that the equilibrium premium for life insurance will change if individuals can gather information about their risk type before buying life insurance. Depending on the scenario, it is possible (i) that all individuals in this market lose (in comparison to the situation where the test is not available), (ii) that some gain and some lose or (iii) that all individuals gain.
The model
Each individual faces the possibility of death, with probability denoted p. If no insurance is purchased then if this person dies (the death state) the surviving family members earn income from assets in amount K while if the person lives (the life state) income is made up of earned income Y as well as income from assets K. The individual may purchase insurance in amount L at price l and so transform income in the state in which he lives to K 1 Y 2 lL and income in the state in which he dies to K 1 (1 2 l)L. Letting u(.) represent utility in the life state and v(.) utility for surviving members in the death state, then expected utility as a 4 function of insurance purchases is
Only nonnegative amounts of insurance can be chosen, L $ 0. Note that the life state and death state could also represent situations in which the individual is sufficiently healthy to earn income or not, respectively. Thus, the model can be used to understand disability insurance as well. Individuals have different probabilities of death and we assume that these are not observed by insurers. As in Villeneuve (1996) , we assume that the insurers also do not observe total insurance purchases and so quantity rationing as a self-selection device is not relevant; a realistic assumption for life insurance markets. Thus, insurers sell whatever quantity is demanded at a single price. The industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive and the only costs are from paying out claims. Thus, insurance is offered at the pooled actuarially fair rate. As in Villeneuve (1996) , it will be shown here that the market will partition into individuals who do not participate and individuals who do participate. If more than one risk type participates in the market it follows that at any given price, demand for insurance is higher the greater is an individual's probability of death and so the market price is always greater than the actuarially fair rate for the participant with the lowest probability of death. It is also possible that only the highest risk type participates in the market.
All of our results can be derived in a simple framework with four possible types indicated by their loss probabilities 0 , p , p , p , p , 1, and often we
only need three types. One can think of the L-types as the low risk class, the M-types as the medium risk class, the H-types as the high risk class and the HH-types as the very high risk class. Note that individuals who are initially ''uninformed'' and for whom a test is available must belong to one of the middle risk types (either p or p ) before the test; since every nontrivial test will convey M H positive or negative information, they cannot belong to one of the most extreme types before the test. An individual with probability of death p and facing price of insurance l solves the following problem:
which is always satisfied. Let L( p,l) denote the optimal insurance demand as a * function of p and l; sometimes we also use L or L to denote the optimal t t insurance demand of type t.
Assumption 1.
We assume that at zero insurance purchases the marginal utility of income is higher in the death state than in the life state (i.e., u9(K 1 Y) , v9(K)).
Applying Assumption 1 to the first order condition (2) we can conclude that an individual will purchase insurance if the price of insurance is less or equal to the actuarially fair price. We state this as
Lemma 1. If l # p then an individual of risk type t will participate in the market
One implication of Lemma 1 is that the highest risk class always purchases a positive amount of insurance.
Lemma 2 below indicates the condition under which an individual of risk type p t will not participate in the market. This result also follows directly from the individual's first-order condition.
Lemma 2. An individual of risk type t will not participate in the market if and only if
As a direct result of Lemma 2 we can see that there will be a critical value of p, call it p , such that the market will segment into those individuals who do purchase c 5 insurance ( p . p ) and those who do not ( p # p ). Note that the set of
individuals who purchase insurance is never empty but the set of individuals who do not purchase insurance may be empty and so all individuals participating in the market is a possibility. We sum up this paragraph as Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. There exists a value p such that L(
Lemma 4 below indicates how demand for insurance varies for individuals as the risk of death, p, varies, given a fixed price of insurance l. The higher is the risk of death for an individual, the higher is his demand for life insurance:
This follows from applying the implicit function theorem to the first order condition (2). As in Doherty and Thistle (1996) , an individual will have an incentive to become informed by a costless test if this does not change her market opportunities as will be the case if insurers cannot use test results for pricing either for legal reasons, as described in the introduction, or simply because they cannot observe that an individual took a test. The reason for this is that, with no price effects (i.e., if there is no premium risk), knowing one's risk type allows one to make a more informed choice about the optimal level of insurance coverage. However, when a sufficiently large number of individuals become better informed about their risk types, there will be market price effects as changes in demand by different risk types will lead to changes in the average cost of providing insurance. We address this issue next.
Up to now, we treated l as exogenous. In the equilibrium, l will be determined by the following Eq. (5) which indicates that the insurance industry must make zero expected profits: types in the summation in (5) effectively includes only those types who purchase insurance (i.e., those for whom p . p ).
If the premium l satisfies (5), insurers break even on average. Since each firm charges the same price in equilibrium, it is presumed that each firm selects different risk types in the population with the same relative frequencies and so the condition of zero expected profit for the industry also implies zero expected profit 6 for each firm. Existence of a solution which lies between p and p is guaranteed
guaranteed that there is a unique value of l which satisfies (5). If there exist multiple solutions of (5), we assume that the equilibrium premium is given by the smallest solution, l. The reason for this is as follows. Suppose we were in an ] equilibrium with a higher value of l; then an insurer could deviate and charge a 7 premium of l 1 e (for e small enough but positive) and make a profit; hence ] there cannot be an equilibrium corresponding to a higher value of l than l. ]
Sometimes it is useful to write (5) in the following form:
OqL(p, l) t t t [T l must be equal to the weighted average risk of insurance buyers, where the weights are the respective insurance demands. The right hand side of (6) is also referred to as 'average clientele risk'. Note that by Lemma 4, higher risks buy more insurance. On the right hand side of (6), higher risks have a higher weight in 6 This is a usual assumption in insurance models with pooling equilibria (e.g., see Wilson's (1977) discussion of his E2 equilibrium).
7 At l, P(l) must cross the abscissa from below, otherwise l could not be the lowest zero, taking ] ] account of the fact that P( p ) , 0. Hence P(l 1 e) . 0. L ] the calculation of the average life insurance buyer's risk than what corresponds to their proportion in the population, and low risks have a lower weight than their proportion in the population. Hence, life insurance buyers' average risk (the average taken with respect to the weights given by demands) is greater than the average risk of the population (here the average taken with respect to the proportions of types in the population), even when all risk types participate in the market.
Results
We now turn to our results on the ex ante welfare effects of the testing possibilities when we take account of the fact that such opportunities affect the equilibrium premium. Each of the following subsections refers to a qualitatively different initial scenario.
Recipients of the test initially do not purchase insurance
This result pertains to a scenario in which there is a test for a group which ex ante would not buy insurance. Clearly, this group must be (at least weakly) better off by the testing opportunity because it is still feasible for them not to buy insurance after any test result; however, in some cases it might be optimal to buy insurance after the test, and then the group for which the test is available is better off from an ex ante point of view. The effect for previous insurance buyers may be positive or negative. If those individuals who test positive and buy life insurance ex post have a higher probability of death than the average ex ante insurance buyer, the premium goes up and ex ante insurance buyers are worse off. However, it is also possible that those individuals who test positive are better risk types than average ex ante insurance buyers; then, the premium goes down and ex ante insurance buyers are better off. Let us state this formally. Given the testing scenario 2, we have q 5 q 1 (1 2 r )q ,
r q and q 5 q . Before testing, the profit function is
H H H HH HH HH and after testing, the profit function is
Evaluating P (l) at l , the lowest zero of P (l), gives
which is positive since p , l , p . Hence the lowest zero of P , l , must be
to the left of l ; i.e., l , l . The proof for case 1 is analogous and omitted. h
The intuition underlying this proposition can be easily seen by reference to Fig.  1 M-types who are determined to be of a relatively higher risk are determined to be H-types. When these individuals purchase insurance after the test, the result is that the equilibrium price of insurance falls (since p , l ), hence providing a benefit to all pre-existing insurance buyers. Consider, however, the case in which M-types who are determined to be of a relatively higher risk are determined to be HH-types. When these individuals purchase insurance after the test, the result is that the equilibrium price of insurance rises (since p . l ), hence making all HH 0 pre-existing insurance buyers worse off. One can infer a straightforward generalization of this proposition to the case where many types who initially are only partially informed of their risk types but do not purchase insurance become better informed, with some then buying insurance. If the average weighted loss probability for those better informed individuals who become insurance buyers is below the pre-test price of insurance, l , then the testing opportunity not only 0 increases expected utility (ex ante) for those taking the test but also improves expected utility for pre-existing insurance buyers. Of course, the opposite scenario is also possible. Two further remarks are in order concerning Proposition 1. First, we assumed in the proof of Proposition 1 that all M-types obtain the test (as this leads to an increase in their expected utility in our model), but even if only some M-types test, the result is unchanged. Second, the fact that there exist some types who do not participate in the insurance market is a feature which distinguishes our model of the life insurance market from the standard model of insurance. Hence, Proposition 1 cannot be replicated in the standard model of adverse selection in an insurance market (fixed loss, different probabilities of loss), since all types in these models buy at least some insurance. However, if we change the standard model a little in the direction of realism and assume that associated with all insurance policies is a fixed administrative cost (i.e., fixed with respect to the degree of coverage chosen), then it is easy to see that it is possible that low risk types do not find it worthwhile to incur the fixed costs and so choose not to insure. In this variant of the standard model, similar results as in Proposition 1 can be derived, so these results are not a peculiarity of our life insurance model.
All life insurance buyers are ex ante homogeneous and recipients of the test
Next we turn to the case in which life insurance buyers are a homogeneous group before they take the test. Given homogeneous expectations, all individuals perceive themselves to be subject to the average loss probability of the population and so purchase the same (positive) amount of insurance. This leads to an equilibrium price of insurance, l, which is equal to the average loss probability. In this case we can show that the premium increase introduced by the test due to ex post adverse selection makes everybody worse off from an ex ante point of view. Before we can proceed, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Define l( p) 5 L( p, l 5 p). For those individuals who face a risk type
specific actuarially fair price, a change in the probability of death has an ambiguous effect on the level of demand. That is,
v 0 dp pu0 1 (1 2 p)v0 HH-types with probability r and L-types (or M-types) with probability (1 2 r). All H-types will take the test and they will be worse off from an ex ante perspective.
where the envelope theorem allows us to ignore (≠H / ≠l)?(≠l / ≠p). Differentiating Eq. (14) a second time yields
Using the first-order condition, Eq. (2), we have for l 5 p that v9 5 u9 and so the first four terms above cancel out; hence 2 2
Using the expression from Lemma 5 for l9, we have
99 99
Hence, H( p) is concave and that establishes Proposition 2. h This proposition illustrates the impact of one of the sources of possible negative effects of information about risk type. In this scenario a group of individuals initially do not have differential information about their specific risk types and so face an actuarially fair pooled price of insurance. The introduction of information about their risk types induces those who discover they are worse risks than previously anticipated to purchase more insurance, which drives up the price of insurance to the extent that those who discover they are of lower risk type no longer participate in the market. Thus, the newly discovered high risk types end up paying insurance at a price which is actuarially fair relative to their risk class. The lower risk types, who end up not purchasing any insurance, are worse off than they would be if they could signal themselves as lower risk and receive their risk type specific actuarially fair price. Thus, from an ex ante perspective the outcome is worse than if individuals simply faced premium risk. By establishing the inequality (10) we have shown that from an ex ante perspective individuals would even be made worse off as a result of facing an actuarially fair lottery over prices and so, a fortiori, they are worse off when the lower risk types end up with no insurance.
Individuals who purchase insurance, ex ante to the test, are heterogeneous
Finally, let us explore the case in which life insurance buyers are ex ante heterogeneous (belong to different risk types) and in which the test pertains to a group which is among the ex ante life insurance buyers. Intuitively, if the group for which the test is available is sufficiently small relative to the pool of individuals purchasing insurance, then adverse effects of testing on the equilibrium price will not outweigh the positive effects of a more informed choice for this group, so they will be better off. Of course, all other life insurance buyers just suffer from a price increase with no offsetting benefit, so they are worse off; no Pareto comparison can be made in this case. On the contrary, if the group for which the test is available is sufficiently large, we are almost in the situation of Proposition 2 and hence also the group for which the test is available will suffer more from increased adverse selection than it benefits from making a more informed choice. Also in this case, all other life insurance buyers suffer from a price increase, so they are worse off, too; hence in this case there is a Pareto worsening.
Proposition 3. Suppose that initially H and M types (and possibly L-types) buy life insurance and nobody is identified as type HH; then suppose there is a test:
1. for H-types, rendering them HH-types with probability r or M types with probability 1 2 r. 2. for H-types, rendering them HH-types with probability r or L types with probability 1 2 r. 3. for M-types, rendering them HH-types with probability r or L types with probability 1 2 r. Proof. We formally prove the proposition for test 1. Although we assume L-types do not participate in the market, either before or after the test, if they did the proof would be similar. The other cases follow analogously. First we prove that if testing occurs and the price l does not change then the average clientele risk (the right hand side of (6)) increases. It then follows from Lemma 1 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) that the new equilibrium premium must be higher. As a result of the increase in the price, those who don't test are made worse off. If the group that tests is small, then the advantage to these individuals of knowing more accurately their risk type and so making better informed insurance purchasing decisions exceeds the loss from the higher price.
Since only H and M-types are assumed initially to buy insurance we have that the average risk without testing is:
the highest risk type possible. The result is an increase in the price of insurance, regardless of whether those who discover they are a lower risk end up purchasing insurance or not. The intuition for this outcome is that from Lemma 4 we know that demand for insurance is positively related to the perceived risk level, p. Consistency requires that the weighted average of the two groups' ex post perceived risk levels be the same as that of the tested individuals from the ex ante perspective. Thus, the effect of the changes in demand for insurance is an increase in the price. Thus, the average clientele risk rises as a result of testing even if those perceived to be better risks as a result of testing continue to purchase insurance. Proposition 3 has particular relevance to the current situation regarding knowledge and practice in genetic testing. Many genetic tests are just now being developed and so the highest risk types are not yet identified in the population. When a test, such as the genetic tests for the breast cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 becomes widely available, it introduces new information to those who opt for the test, including the possibility of a much higher perceived risk of breast 8 cancer. In terms of the relevant risk perception parameters held before and after the test and depending on an individual's circumstances, this type of information may be consistent with any one of the three scenarios of Proposition 3. Moreover, this type of situation is also consistent with the presumption that only a small group may become tested. For example, it is plausible that in the ex ante situation only a subset of individuals may have a health episode which is symptomatic of a particular genetic disease and so induces these individuals to take a genetic test 9 with some testing positive for the disease and others testing negative. Alternatively, under private and differentiated health insurance schemes, some in-10 dividuals may have access to costless testing while others do not.
Conclusion
Additional information about life expectancy, especially through genetic tests, will become more and more important as the state of science progresses. Individuals have an economic incentive to acquire such information if we assume either that insurers cannot observe whether an individual was tested or that legislation prevents insurers from using such information, both realistic possibilities. In a market where ex ante information is symmetrically distributed, the 8 For a detailed discussion of relevant probabilities associated with BRCA1 and BRCA2 carrier status, see Easton et al. (1995 Easton et al. ( , 1997 .
9 Those who experience the health episode will temporarily be of intermediate risk type but the presumption is that the testing occurs soon enough after the health episode that decisions about insurance purchases would not be taken in the interim.
10 Of course social costs should include the cost of the test in this instance, but they are not private marginal costs from the insured's perspective. availability of the test decreases ex ante welfare; of course, in a more general model, this welfare loss would have to be weighed against possible gains due to the test since more information makes better medical treatments available. In a market with initial informational asymmetry, the welfare effects of a new test could go either way; we constructed examples for a Pareto improvement, a Pareto worsening and for a situation in which those who are tested gain and those who are not lose. At the moment, we believe that the last case is the most realistic one for genetic testing in which those who test positive for a certain gene causing a fatal illness receive very bad information, and are then probably worse risks than the average life insurance buyer, so the equilibrium premium will go up. Since only few people are tested currently, however, the price effect will be small. Hence those who are tested gain since they have the possibility to adjust their life insurance demand to their real risk type for an only moderately higher price. However, as genetic testing becomes available more widely and for less serious illnesses or also for certain other tests, the other scenarios we have investigated, in which testing can lead to either Pareto improvements or worsenings, are relevant.
